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11 THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERTA FANNEY GASKILI a/k i i 
LEE OR LEA GASKILL, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
Il Ill III! i.,Abl'. II li, 
Defendant /Appellant: 
Case No. 920632 C:A 
Prior1* tv No * ~-
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on tins Cour t pursuant L W 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann, *j 1r. 1 1 (? | provides: 
(2) Unless the parties to a lawful contract 
specify a different rate of interest, the legal rate of 
interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, 
or chose in action shall be 10% per annum. 
Utah Code Ann § 30-4a-] (enacted 1983) provides: 
IVutl loi: ity of court. 
A court havi ng jurisdiction may .,- upoi l its 
finding of good cause and giving of such notice as may be 
ordered, enter an order nunc pro tunc in a matter 
relating to marriage, divorce, legal separation or 
annulment of marriage. 
Utah Code Ann. § / o - ^ - ^ provides: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
78-12-22. Within eight years. 
Within eight years: 
An action upon a judgment or decree of any 
court of the United States or of any state or territory 
within the United States. 
An action to enforce any liability due or to 
become due, for failure to provide support or maintenance 
for dependent children. 
Rule 4(g)(4) of the Utah rules of Civil procedure, as it 
existed in 1976 provided1: 
(g) Manner of proof. Within 5 days after 
service of process, proof thereof shall be made as 
follows: 
• • . 
(4) By the written admission or waiver of 
service by the person to be served, duly acknowledged, or 
otherwise proved. 
Rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides2: 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A 
motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served no 
later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil procedure 
provides3: 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; 
newly discovered evidence; fraud; etc. On motion and 
upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
xThis rule is embodied in substantially similar form in 
current Rule 4(h)(5). 
This rule has been in effect in its current form since this 
suit was initiated in 1976. 
3This rule has been in effect in its current form since this 
suit was initiated in 1976. 
2 
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furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under 
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any 
cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and 
the defendant has failed to appear in said action; (5) 
the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been 
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment 
upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise 
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment 
should have any prospective application; or (7) any 
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment• The motion shall be made within a reasonable 
time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 
3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was 
entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) 
does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court 
to entertain an independent action to relieve a party 
from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a 
judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion 
as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In 
a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of 
right from the trial court to the appellate court, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with 
the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the 
date of entry of judgment or order appealed from. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the court abused its discretion by denying 
amendment of the original decree nunc pro tunc? 
3 
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Standard of Review. "A trial court's decision concerning 
modification of a divorce decree will not be disturbed absent an 
abuse of discretion." Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah 
App. 1991) (citing Haqan v. Haqan, 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App. 
1991)). Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-l provides that the trial court 
"may, upon its finding of good cause . . . enter an order nunc pro 
tunc" in domestic matters. This statute leaves the decision within 
the sound discretion of the trial court. Although nominally titled 
a petition to modify a decree nunc pro tunc, R. 34, in effect Mr. 
Gaskill is again seeking relief from a judgment similar to the 
relief available under Rule 60(b). "The trial court is afforded 
broad discretion in ruling on a motion for relief from judgment 
under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b), and its determination will not be 
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 
1114, 1117 (Utah App. 1989). Accord, Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 
93 (Utah 1986); Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah 
1984). 
2. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in 
concluding that Mrs. Gaskill had not waived and was not estopped 
from asserting her right to alimony? 
Standard of review. These matters were submitted on 
affidavits by stipulation of the parties, R. 87, and a summary 
judgment standard is therefore applicable. 
Summary Judgment is appropriate only when no 
genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The 
facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom are viewed in 
4 
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the light most favorable to the losing party and are 
affirmed only where it appears that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material issues of fact, or where, even 
according to the facts as contended by the losing party, 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. However, it is [the losing party]'s burden to show 
that there are specific material facts which preclude a 
grant of summary judgment. Since summary judgment is 
granted as a matter of law rather than fact, the trial 
court's legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness. 
Hunt v. ESI Enq'q, Inc., 808 P.2d 1137, 1139 (Utah App. 1991) 
(cites omitted). 
3. Whether the trial court erred in calculating the 
amount of the judgment? 
Standard of review. The amount of the judgment 
constitutes a finding of fact, and will be reversed only if shown 
to be clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Hinckley v. Hinckley, 815 P.2d 
1352, 1353 (Utah App. 1991). 
On appeal, it is the burden of the party seeking to 
overturn the trial court's decision to "marshall the 
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate 
that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings 
are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear 
weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly 
erroneous.'" 
Haqan v. Haqan, 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App.1991) (quoting In re 
Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987))). "If the appellant fails 
to marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the 
record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a 
review of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and 
the application of that law in the case." Crouse v. Crouse, 817 
5 
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P.2d 836, 838 (Utah App. 1991). Accord, Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 
147, 150 (Utah 1987). 
4. Whether Mrs. Gaskill is entitled to attorneys' fees 
incurred in defending this appeal? 
Standard of review. 
"'Ordinarily, when fees in a divorce have been awarded 
below to a party who then prevails on appeal, fees will 
also be awarded to that party on appeal.'" 
Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 840 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting Bell 
v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah App. 1991)(quoting Burt v. Burt, 
799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah App. 1990))). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Lea Gaskill ("Lea") filed for divorce in September, 1976. 
Don Gaskill ("Don") signed a motion for waiver of the interlocutory 
period, and a consent and waiver, both of which were prepared by 
Lea's counsel. The consent and waiver provided that Don 
"acknowledges the receipt of a copy of the Complaint herein, waives 
service of Summons upon him, waives time and consents that his 
default may be entered and that the Court may proceed to hear and 
determine said cause at any time and without notice to said 
defendant." Don had handwritten "Omit #8 on Complaint" on the 
consent and waiver. Paragraph 8 of the complaint is concerned with 
alimony. Judge Sawaya entered Don's default, decreed the parties 
divorce, and ordered that Don pay Lea $450.00 per month alimony. 
In September 1978, Lea obtained on order to show cause. 
Mr. Gaskill responded by challenging the original judgment and 
6 
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attempting to obtain its modification to eliminate alimony. Both 
sides failed to prosecute, and the judge dismissed both matters 
without prejudice. The judgment remained in full force, and is to 
date fully valid. 
In August, 1991, Lea domesticated the judgment in the 
state of Washington and attempted to recover delinquent alimony 
there. Don reopened the Utah action, again seeking modification of 
the original judgment nunc pro tunc. Lea moved for entry of 
judgment. Commissioner Evans, by stipulation of the parties, heard 
argument and entered his recommendations on matters of law based on 
submitted affidavits. Don filed an objection, and Judge Sawaya 
affirmed this objection and entered judgment for Lea Gaskill. This 
appeal ensued. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Lea Gaskill ("Lea") filed for divorce from Don Gaskill 
("Don") on September 8, 1976 by means of a verified complaint. R. 
2-4. Also on September 1, Lea and Don signed a "Motion for Waiver 
of the Interlocutory Period." R. 5. On September 8, Don signed a 
Consent and Waiver in which he "acknowledges the receipt of a copy 
of the Complaint herein, waives service of Summons upon him, waives 
time and consents that his default may be entered and that the 
Court may proceed to hear and determine said cause at any time and 
without notice to said defendant." In Don's handwriting is written 
"Omit #8 on Complaint". R. 6. The "Motion for Waiver of the 
7 
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Interlocutory Period" and "Consent and Waiver" were filed in the 
court by Lea on September 15,1976. R.5,6. 
Paragraph 8 of the complaint states in its entirety: 
8. That the defendant pay the plaintiff 
$700.00 per month alimony for a period of 30 months, 
after which time the defendant has agreed to pay the 
plaintiff $450.00 per month for the remainder of her 
life, providing, however, that should the plaintiff re-
marry all alimony payments shall cease forthwith. 
R. 3. 
Don Gaskill made no further appearance prior to entry of 
judgment. The court entered findings of fact and conclusions of 
law noting the waiver signed by Mr. Gaskill, entering his default 
and awarding Lea Gaskill judgment for alimony in the amount of 
$450.00 per month until death or remarriage. R. 8-10. The court 
signed a judgment and decree on December 30, 1976, which was duly 
entered on December 31, 1976. R. 11. 
Lea filed on affidavit in support of an order to show 
Cause on April 12, 1978, R. 13, and obtained an order to show cause 
signed by Judge Leary on September 8, 1978, ordering Don Gaskill's 
appearance. R. 14. Mr. Gaskill filed an "Affidavit in Support of 
Motion to Amend Decree of Divorce" on October 23, 1978, premised on 
Rule 60(b)(7). R. 18-20. This affidavit claims, inter alia, that 
Mr. Gaskill was unaware that a judgment for alimony had been 
entered until he was served with the show cause order, R. 19 at 119, 
which was served on him on September 15, 1978, R. 16. 
Hearing was held on November 21, 1978, and respective 
counsel for both plaintiff and defendant were requested to file 
memoranda. R. 24. On July 2, 1979, after neither party had 
8 
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submitted a memorandum, the court on its own motion dismissed the 
matter without prejudice. R. 25. 
No further activity occurred until Lea domesticated the 
judgment in Washington and sought delinquent alimony in Superior 
Court of Washington County, State of Washington, on August 19, 
1991. See R. 79, 1112. 
On December 10, 1991, Mr. Gaskill filed a "Verified 
Petition to Modify Decree" in the Third District Court in Utah. R. 
34-37. Lea subsequently filed a motion for entry of judgment for 
delinquent alimony. R. 47-52. 
By stipulation of the parties, Commissioner Evans 
reviewed affidavits and heard argument on legal issues. The 
Commissioner ruled in favor of Lea, R. 87-93. Don Gaskill 
objected. R. 94-5. Judge Sawaya affirmed, R. 110, and entered 
judgment for $81,239.36. R. 114. Counsel for Don Gaskill made no 
effort to correct the amount of the judgment in the trial court by 
objecting to the proposed form of judgment, or by motion under 
rules 59(a) or 60, but instead appealed immediately. 
Lea Gaskill was awarded her attorney's fees by minute 
entry dated November 12, 1992, see Addendum A, and an Order 
Awarding Attorney's Fees dated December 2, 1992, see Addendum B. 
Mr. Gaskill has not appealed from this ruling. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The court's ruling is proper and should be affirmed. Mr. 
Gaskill submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by 
9 
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signing the consent and waiver on September 8, 1976. Regardless of 
the merits of Mr. Gaskill1s claims with respect to the validity of 
the judgment, Mr. Gaskill failed to prosecute his challenge to the 
validity of the judgment when he became aware in 1978 that the 
judgment existed. As a result, the judgment has stood with full 
force and effect. 
The court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mr. 
Gaskillfs motion for modification of the alimony order nunc pro 
tunc. The original judgment and decree of divorce is in all 
regards proper, and Mr. Gaskill failed to challenge the judgment in 
a proper, timely fashion. 
Mrs. Gaskill has not waived her rights to alimony, and is 
not estopped from asserting such rights. Mr. Gaskill cannot point 
to any written agreement, any parol agreement, or any action on the 
part of Lea that would preclude her recovery. Except as limited by 
the eight year statute of limitations, Mrs. Gaskill is entitled to 
full recovery of the alimony owing by Mr. Gaskill. 
Mr. Gaskill failed to make a record below, and has failed 
to marshal the evidence in support of the court's ruling as to the 
amount. Absent proper marshaling, this Court should assume that 
the record supports the trial court's ruling. 
Mrs. Gaskill was awarded her attorney's fees below, and 
is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal. 
10 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE ORIGINAL 1976 JUDGMENT AND 
DECREE OF DIVORCE IS PROPER AND VALID IN 
ALL RESPECTS; THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY DECLINING TO 
MODIFY IT NUNC PRO TUNC. 
A. MR. GASKILL SIGNED A VALID WAIVER, 
SUBMITTING HIMSELF TO THE 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT. 
Similar to current Rule 4(h)(5), Rule 4(g)(4) (as it 
existed in 1976) provided: 
(g) Manner of proof. Within 5 days after 
service of process, proof thereof shall be made as 
follows: 
• • • 
(4) By the written admission or waiver of 
service by the person to be served, duly acknowledged, or 
otherwise proved. 
In the instant case, Mr. Gaskill executed a fully valid and 
effective waiver. It stated that he: 
acknowledges the receipt of a copy of the Complaint 
herein, waives service of Summons upon him, waives time 
and consents that his default may be entered and that the 
Court may proceed to hear and determine said cause at any 
time and without notice to said defendant. 
R. 6. 
The waiver signed by Mr. Gaskill comports with all the 
requirements of Rule 4(g)(4). In Locke v. Peterson, 285 P.2d 1111, 
1112 (Utah 1955), the Utah Supreme Court held that a waiver signed 
in the presence of plaintiff's attorney would comport with the rule 
where the attorney represented to the court that it in fact was the 
defendant's signature on the waiver. In this case, Mr. Gaskillfs 
signature was properly acknowledged by a notary public. Nothing 
11 
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more is required. The waiver signed by Mr. Gaskill gave the court 
in personam jurisdiction over Mr. Gaskill. 
Even without the waiver signed by Mr. Gaskill, his 
signature on the "Motion For Waiver of the Interlocutory Period" 
constitutes a general appearance subjecting Mr. Gaskill to the 
courtfs jurisdiction. "[I]f a party asks the court for affirmative 
relief, that party is subject to the court's jurisdiction." Nunley 
v. Nunley, 757 P.2d 473, 475 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Downey State 
Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507, 510 (Utah 1976). 
The court had valid in personam jurisdiction to enter an 
award of alimony under either the Consent and Waiver, or by reason 
of Mr. Gaskillfs request for affirmative relief in waiving the 
interlocutory period. Mr. Gaskillfs remarriage has forced him to 
argue that he submitted to conditional jurisdiction rather than 
challenge jurisdiction in its entirety, since he obviously could 
not remarry if his prior divorce decree was void for lack of 
jurisdiction. However, Mr. Gaskill cites no authority for the 
proposition that an appearance can be anything other than special 
(to challenge jurisdiction) or general (and hence unconditional). 
The "conditional appearance doctrine" that Mr. Gaskill would have 
this Court adopt does not appear to exist anywhere, much less in 
Utah. 
B. MR. GASKILL WAS PROPERLY DEFAULTED 
AFTER HE FAILED TO ANSWER. 
Mr. Gaskill failed to file an answer or otherwise present 
defenses. Seventy days after Mr. Gaskill signed the waiver of 
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service of summons, a hearing was held on the merits. R.7 The 
trial court duly noted the default of Mr. Gaskill, see Rule 55, 
U.R.C.P., and entered judgment accordingly. 
Mr. Gaskill now asserts that he did not consent to entry 
of a judgment for alimony. However, Lea does not rely on the 
language in the waiver to support entry of judgment. Mr. Gaskill's 
interlineated terms may be sufficient to prevent entry of a default 
judgment which includes alimony based solely on the waiver. But 
after Mr. Gaskill waived service, and after his default, the court 
was justified in entering judgment in accordance with the terms of 
the complaint irrespective of what, if anything, the waiver said 
with respect to entry of a default judgment. See Rule 55(b). 
Regardless of whether or not Mr. Gaskill intended to consent to a 
judgment for alimony, his waiver establishes jurisdiction, and his 
failure to answer or present defenses operates as a matter of law 
to allow the court to enter a default judgment for the relief 
sought in the complaint. 
If this Court grants Mr. Gaskill the relief it now seeks, 
it will effectively eliminate the availability of acceptance of 
service in conformity with Rule 4(h)(5). Parties would hereafter 
waive service, but object to entry of any adverse judgment by 
interlineating "Omit prayer for relief" on the waiver. Thereafter, 
if judgment is rendered for plaintiff, defendant has only to assert 
that there was no personal jurisdiction against him to effectively 
eliminate the judgment. To guard against this, parties would be 
required to utilize actual service. Mr. Gaskill's claims thus 
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conflict with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which allow waiver 
of service. See, e.g., Soltanieh v. King, 826 P.2d 1076, 1078 
(Utah App. 1992) (defendant residing in Iran submitted himself to 
court's jurisdiction in divorce proceeding by signing waiver and 
consent). Mr. Gaskillfs contentions are not and should not be the 
law in Utah. Mr. Gaskill was properly defaulted. 
C. MR. GASKILL FAILED TO PROSECUTE HIS 
CHALLENGE TO THE VALIDITY OF THE 
JUDGMENT IN A TIMELY MANNER. 
Default judgments are admittedly harsh; however, parties 
are required to accept the consequences of their own actions. 
Nobody forced Mr. Gaskill to sign the waiver of service. Had he 
refused, Mrs. Gaskill would have served him in the traditional 
manner, and Mr. Gaskill would be precluded from making the 
challenges to the original judgment and decree that he currently 
presents on this appeal. He cannot have it both ways. His signed 
and sworn statement states that he consented to the court's 
jurisdiction. He cannot now assert that such consent was 
conditional upon an ambiguous, hand-written interlineation to an 
otherwise clear document. 
Mr. Gaskill had his opportunity to contest the judgment 
in 1978, but declined to carry the action through to its 
conclusion. The court only wanted the matter briefed before it 
ruled on the merits. Mr. Gaskill did not follow through. 
Mr. Gaskill had his opportunities to address this issue 
and waived them. He could have filed an answer in 1976 and 
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litigated this matter to its conclusion, but he chose not to do so. 
He could have litigated this issue in 1978, but he failed to submit 
the memorandum requested by the court, and the matter was dismissed 
without prejudice. He could have challenged this dismissal, but 
again chose not to do so. Mr. Gaskill has placed himself in the 
situation where he finds himself. He must live with the results of 
his own actions. 
Rule 60 provides that a motion for relief from a judgment 
may be made within a "reasonable time." In Workman v. Naqle 
Constr. Co., 802 P.2d 749 (Utah App. 1990), the defendant did not 
receive notice of the judgment until over a year after it was 
entered. Within a month after learning of the judgment, defendant 
moved under Rule 60(b) to set the judgment aside. The Court of 
Appeals held that the motion was timely. In so doing, it stated: 
If a party has had notice of the judgment but has 
nevertheless remained idle in attacking it in the court 
of rendition or in appealing it, that lack of diligence 
is a strong reason not to disturb the judgment. 
Id. at 751.4 
Workman demonstrates that courts are receptive to reviewing 
the propriety of default judgments where the judgment debtor is not 
notified of the judgment, but only if the debtor takes prompt 
action after becoming apprised of the existence of the judgment, 
and prosecutes the matter diligently. Mr. Gaskill was sufficiently 
In contrast to the present case, the Workman court relied in 
part on plaintiff's failure to give notice of entry of judgment 
under Rule 58A(d) (as amended 1985). Lea Gaskill in this case had 
no corresponding obligation under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
in effect in 1976. 
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prompt in challenging the propriety of the judgment soon after he 
learned of its existence, but he failed to prosecute the matter to 
a final determination. His attempt to have the issue addressed 
now, over a dozen years later, is untimely and must fail. 
In Heath v. Heath, 541 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1975), a husband 
moved to vacate a default divorce decree three and one-half years 
after it was entered. The Supreme Court noted his failure to file 
any answer for over two months, at which time default judgment was 
entered. "He then slept on his alleged rights for 3£ years, when 
belatedly he attempted to rectify his failure to plead and 
protraction, by filing a motion to vacate the decree on the 
strength of several false assumptions . . . " Id. at 1041. The 
Supreme Court declined to grant him any relief. The final 
paragraph of the opinion is prophetic for Mr. Gaskill: 
We believe and hold that the lower court did 
not err, but that under the Rules, the authorities and 
the circumstances extant here, the defendant did by 
urging too little too late. 
Id. 
Mr. Gaskill can fare no better. In this case, Mr. 
Gaskill learned of the judgment at the latest in September of 1978. 
He filed a motion, but failed to follow through. He now seeks the 
same relief sought over 14 years ago, four times as long as the 
period found in Heath to be excessive. Under Rule 60(b), he is 
untimely. He is obviously also untimely under Rule 59(b) and under 
Rule 4(a) of the Rules of Appellate procedure. 
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D. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT 
THERE WAS NO "GOOD CAUSE" UNDER 
§ 30-4a-l FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER OF 
NO ALIMONY NUNC PRO TUNC, 
Having failed to take timely action under the rules, Mr. 
Gaskill is forced to make his last ditch effort under Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-4a-l. 
Mr. Gaskill does not address the issue as to retroactive 
application of § 30-4a-l, enacted in 1983, to modify a decree 
entered in 1976. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 provides "[n]o part of 
these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so 
declared." Although the general statutory non-retroactivity rule 
has been held not to apply if a statute is merely procedural, see 
State Dep't of Social Services v. Hiqqs, 656 P.2d 998, 1000 (Utah 
1982), "[e]very amendment not expressly characterized as a 
clarification carries the rebuttable presumption that it is 
intended to change existing legal rights and liabilities." State 
v. Amador, 804 P.2d 1233, 1234 (Utah App. 1990). Mr. Gaskill has 
not even attempted to rebut this presumption. 
Even if § 30-4a-l is applicable, Mr. Gaskill is not 
entitled to relief. Controlling precedent shows that Mr. Gaskill 
did not present evidence sufficient to support a showing of good 
cause, and that he seeks to use Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-l for an 
improper purpose. Baqshaw v. Baqshaw, 788 P.2d 1057 (Utah App. 
1990) is determinative: 
While section 30-4a-l has a broad remedial 
scope, it does not abrogate all the common law trappings 
of nunc pro tunc law. At common law, nunc pro tunc 
allowed a court to correct its earlier error or supply 
its omission so the record accurately reflected that 
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which in fact had taken place. Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 
298, 299 (Utah 1984); Hornefv. Home], 737 P.2d [244] at 
246 [(Utah App. 1987)]. Cases in which courts 
traditionally have applied the nunc pro tunc doctrine 
fall into two categories: 
(1) those in which one of the parties died 
after the submission of the case to the lower 
court for its decision, but before the actual 
rendition of judgment; and (2) those in which 
a judgment has in fact been rendered by the 
lower court, but the clerk has failed to 
perform the ministerial function of entry. 
6A J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice fl 58.08 (1989). 
The second category is based upon the principle 
that "where the delay in rendering judgment or decree 
arises from the act of the court, that is, where the 
delay has been for its convenience, or has been caused by 
the multiplicity or press of business or the intricacy of 
the questions involved, or of any other cause not 
attributable to the laches of the parties, but within the 
control of the court; the judgment or the decree may be 
entered retrospectively...." Mitchell v. Overman, 103 
U.S. 62, 64-65, 26 L.Ed. 369 (1881) (emphasis added); see 
also 6 A J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice H 58.08 
(1989). 
These general principles of the common law of 
nunc pro tunc are relevant, if not controlling, in a 
determination of good cause under section 3Q-4a-l. In 
this case, the court did not make the clerical error, but 
taking the facts in the light most favorable to the 
Husband, Husband did. It is undisputed that the court 
never received the written stipulation mentioned in the 
minute entry. Thus, this alone could support a finding of 
lack of 'good cause' under section 30-4a-l. 
Furthermore, a nunc pro tunc order must, even 
under the more liberal requirements of section 30-4a-l, 
still be entered for the purpose of making the record 
reflect what actually was meant to happen at a prior 
time. 
Baqshaw v. Baqshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 1060-61 (Utah App. 1990) 
(emphasis added). 
Mr. Gaskill does not seek to use § 30-4a-l to make the 
record reflect what actually occurred in 1976. To the contrary, he 
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seeks to change the order that in fact was properly entered in 
1976. Mr. Gaskill seeks to circumvent the time requirements of 
Rules 59 and 60, and/or the procedural requirements of Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-5. "Installments of support payments ordered in a 
divorce decree become vested in the recipient when they become 
due." Coleman v. Coleman, 664 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Utah 1983) (citing 
Bates v. Bates, 560 P.2d 706 (Utah 1977); Larsen v. Larsen, 561 
P.2d 1077 (Utah 1977)). Mr. Gaskill should have litigated this 
matter in 1978, before the alimony installments Mrs. Gaskill now 
seeks to collect vested in her. 
In the present case, the court did not make any clerical 
errors. The trial judge read the Waiver and Consent, read the 
complaint, and noted Mr. Gaskill's default. He further noted that 
Mrs. Gaskill sought initial alimony of $700.00 per month for 30 
months, then $450.00 per month thereafter. The court, acting in 
the interests of justice, determined that $450.00 per month would 
be adequate, and entered its judgment to that effect. 
Any mistakes made were made by Mr. Gaskill. He failed to 
fully apprise the court that he did not consent to entry of a 
judgment for alimony. The interlineated statement on the Waiver 
and Consent is ambiguous at best. It is not the trial court's or 
Mrs. Gaskill1s responsibility to "attempt to advise defendant to 
seek legal counsel before or after he signed the consent and 
waiver," Appellants brief at 30, nor is it "incumbent upon the 
trial court to require that an opportunity to be heard be given Mr. 
Gaskill," Appellants brief at 32. 
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It was Mr. Gaskill1s responsibility to make his position 
clear to the judge, either through counsel, in person, or 
otherwise. His hand-written interlineation "Omit #8 on Complaint" 
obviously failed. Furthermore, the Utah Constitution adequately 
"requirefd] that an opportunity to be heard be given Mr. Gaskill." 
Article I Section 11 provides: 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of Injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for 
an injury done to him in his person, property or 
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or 
defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself 
or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Mr. Gaskill had full opportunity to appear, but declined to do so 
in 1976, or to litigate to judgment in 1978. He waited too long. 
The trial court's finding that there was no "good cause" 
under § 30-4a-l is not clearly erroneous; the trial court's failure 
to modify the 1976 divorce decree nunc pro tunc is not an abuse of 
discretion. 
POINT II. LEA GASKILL HAS NOT WAIVED HER 
RIGHT TO COLLECT ALIMONY, AND IS NOT 
ESTOPPED FROM COLLECTING ALIMONY. 
A. WAIVER. 
This Court has set out a three part test for application 
of the doctrine of waiver: 
In order for waiver to occur, "there must be an existing 
right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its 
existence, and an intention to relinquish it." "The 
party's actions or conduct must evince unequivocally an 
intent to waive, or must be inconsistent with any other 
intent." "Whether a right has been waived is generally 
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a question of fact and therefore we accord considerable 
deference to the finder of fact's determination." 
Hinckley v. Hinckley, 815 P.2d 1352, 1354 (Utah App- 1991) (quoting 
Mont Trucking v. Entrada Indus., 802 P.2d 779, 781 (Utah App. 
1990). 
In this case, the trial court properly found that there 
was no waiver. There was an existing right, specifically, the 
alimony provision in the 1976 decree. Lea Gaskill was clearly 
aware of that right. However, to assert that she ever had an 
intention to abandon that right is purely fanciful, if not 
farcical. 
No action of Mrs. Gaskill is even asserted — Mr. Gaskill 
relies entirely on inactions that occurred during a period when she 
had a purported duty to act. Mr. Gaskill is attempting to treat 
the 1978 dismissal without prejudice as though it finally and 
conclusively determined Mrs. Gaskillfs rights. If the 1978 
dismissal had been with prejudice, then Lea would have had an 
obligation to seek relief, identical to the obligation Mr. Gaskill 
had when the court entered judgment, or, giving him the benefit of 
the doubt, when he learned of the judgment in 1978, or her rights 
would be conclusively determined. 
When Mr. Gaskill learned of the judgment, he had a 
limited opportunity to attempt to "correct" what he perceived to be 
an unjust judgment. When the court dismissed his motion for relief 
without prejudice, it meant precisely that. But the clock 
continued to tick away. Mrs. Gaskillfs judgment was only limited 
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by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-22, the eight year statute of 
limitations. Mr. Gaskillfs motion for relief was limited by the 
timeliness requirements of Rule 60, and the "good cause" 
requirements of nunc pro tunc jurisprudence. 
Time ran out on both parties. Mrs. Gaskill is limited by 
the statute of limitations to collecting alimony arrearages for 
only for the eight years preceding her application. Mr. Gaskill is 
limited by the finality of the divorce decree entered in 1976. 
Mrs. Gaskill's actions have not evinced an unequivocal 
intent to waive, and are not inconsistent with bringing suit at any 
later date. Her inaction merely reflects that she and/or her 
attorney "dropped the ball" at that time, and did not seek to 
pursue the matter further at that time. Since that time, however, 
Mrs. Gaskill has unequivocally evinced her intent to pursue these 
matters at this time. No waiver has occurred. 
The case of Hinckley v. Hinckley 815 P.2d 1352 (Utah 
1991), relied on by Mr. Gaskill, is distinguishable on its facts. 
Mr. Hinckley was entitled to reduce alimony payments by one half of 
Mrs. Hinckley's earnings if she became employed. After Mr. 
Hinckley became aware that his ex-wife was working, he nevertheless 
continued to pay alimony in full without requesting the reduction 
to which he was entitled. These overpayments are affirmative acts, 
not undertaken by mistake, which are inconsistent with his right to 
later claim entitlement to these reductions. Mrs. Gaskill did not 
have to ask for alimony; her entitlement vested each month by 
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operation of law. Lea Gaskill did not waive her right to collect 
alimony. 
B. ESTOPPEL. 
In order to prevail on his theory of estoppel, Mr. 
Gaskill must prove that Mrs. Gaskill, by her representations or 
actions, led him to believe he need not pay alimony, and that in 
reliance on said representations he changed his position to his 
detriment. Ross v. Ross, 592 P.2d 600, 602-3 (Utah 1979). 
The leading case on estoppel to collect alimony is 
Baqshaw v. Baqshaw, 788 P.2d 1057 (Utah App. 1990). The facts are 
I 
surprisingly similar to those in the instant case. Mrs. Bagshaw 
filed a complaint for divorce, seeking $100 per month alimony and 
$200 per month child support.5 Mr. Bagshaw, 
unrepresented by counsel, agreed that a default divorce 
could be entered against him on Wifefs complaint. 
Husband now claims he cannot read and he signed the 
divorce papers based on Wife's alleged representation 
that she wanted only child support and some furniture. 
A divorce decree was entered on January 10, 
1973, which included the amounts of child support and 
alimony requested in the complaint. After the divorce, 
Husband learned of the alimony provision and filed an 
Order to Show Cause seeking modification of the decree to 
terminate the alimony award. 
Id. at 1058. 
On the day of hearing in Baqshaw, Husband alleged that 
the parties' attorneys reached an agreement to terminate alimony. 
The instant case does not involve child support. 
Mr. Gaskill is literate, and does not allege that Mrs. 
Gaskill represented she would not seek alimony. 
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Wife denied any such agreement was reached. The record did reflect 
that "a stipulation was reached between the parties and the matter 
was continued pending a written stipulation and order. However, no 
stipulation was ever entered into the record." Id. at 1059. 
Wife did not seek to enforce the alimony order for over 
14 years. Child support payments were collected by the Office of 
Recovery Services. When Wife attempted to enforce the alimony 
order, Husband moved to enforce the previous alleged stipulation by 
entering an order nunc pro tunc terminating alimony, or in the 
alternative, to find that Wife was estopped from collecting it. 
The trial court found that no stipulation was reached and 
Wife was not estopped from collecting arrearages. This Court 
affirmed: 
In order to prevail on his theory of 
estoppel, plaintiff [Husband] must prove that 
defendant [Wife], by her representations or 
actions led plaintiff to believe he need not 
pay alimony or child support, and that plain-
tiff, in reliance on said representations, 
changed his position to his detriment. In 
such a case, enforcement of the decree creates 
a hardship and injustice to plaintiff, and 
defendant would be estopped to deny her own 
misrepresentations, and estopped from claiming 
unpaid support. 
fRoss v. Ross, 592 P.2d 600] at 602-03 [(Utah 1979)] 
(footnote omitted). 
The trial court heard evidence and found that 
Wife did not engage in unlawful cohabitation after the 
entry of the divorce decree nor did her actions otherwise 
constitute a basis for the termination of alimony. The 
trial court's findings support a conclusion that Wife 
should not be estopped from collecting alimony arrearages 
and we therefore find no error. 
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Bags haw, 788 P. 2d at 1061. On nearly identical facts, the trial 
court below found similarly in the present case. Unlike Baqshaw, 
Mr. Gaskill is not illiterate, there is no allegation that an 
agreement was reached fifteen years ago, and Mrs. Gaskill has not 
collected any support, whereas Mrs. Bagshaw collected child support 
without ever mentioning that she should receive support as well. 
The facts in Baqshaw are therefore more sympathetic to the husband, 
yet even in that case no relief was available. 
The case of Adams v. Adams, 593 P.2d 147 (Utah 1979), 
directly addresses the issue of whether an alimony judgment 
creditor's silence and failure to enforce the judgment for a period 
of time may work as an estoppel: 
Mere silence on the part of plaintiff is not sufficient 
to raise an estoppel, and we find nothing in the record 
to support the Court's finding that she had a duty to 
speak. . . . The record does not show that [Wife] 
misled [Husband] in any way, nor that [Husband] changed 
his position to his detriment in reliance on any 
representations or actions on the part of [Wife]. 
[Husband] cannot rely on his mistaken belief that his 
obligation to pay alimony terminated because he had 
custody of the minor children. Installments of support 
money vest as they become due. The Court has no power to 
modify the decree as to these vested rights, unless it 
finds that each element of equitable estoppel applies. 
None of these elements are present in this case. 
Adams, 593 P.2d at 148 (footnotes omitted). 
Mrs. Gaskill's silence, for whatever period of time, 
cannot work as an estoppel. 
Burrow v. Vrontikis, 788 P.2d 1046 (Utah App. 1990) is 
cited by Mr. Gaskill for the proposition that failure to request 
support for seven years works as an estoppel. This case is not on 
point. In Vrontikis, Ms. Burrow conceived a child while dating Mr. 
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Vrontikis. About five months before birth, Mr. Vrontikis indicated 
an unwillingness to make any commitment to her or the child, but 
offered to pay for an abortion. No further contact was had until 
seven years later, when Ms. Burrow brought a paternity action. 
The court found that Ms. Burrow was estopped by 
representations relayed to Vrontikis, and barred by laches from 
seeking child support after seven years. In this case, Mrs. 
Gaskill did not wait until 12 years after the divorce to seek 
alimony. Instead, she was diligent and made certain that the 
original decree, at the time of its entry, awarded her alimony. 
Had Ms. Burrow obtained a judgment for child support shortly after 
the birth of the child, the entire complexion of the case would 
have been different. On its facts,7 Vrontikis is inapplicable. 
The trial court correctly held that Mrs. Gaskill was not 
estopped from collecting alimony. 
C. MR. GASKILL MISAPPREHENDS THE 
MEANING OF THE JUDGE'S ORDER. 
Point II of Mr. Gaskill's brief (pp. 23-27) address 
whether Mr. Gaskill was estopped from raising the defenses of 
waiver and estoppel. The court never ruled that Mr. Gaskill was 
estopped from asserting these defenses. Rather, the court ruled 
7Beyond the obvious difference that Vrontikis was a paternity 
action seeking child support, whereas this is a divorce action 
involving alimony. 
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that under the undisputed facts in this case these defenses are not 
meritorious. The Commissioner stated : 
Under the present circumstances, it would be inequitable 
to find that either party is estopped from asserting 
their respective positions or that they have waived the 
same. 
R. 91. Neither party was estopped. Neither party waived any of 
their rights. Under the present circumstances (i.e. under 
undisputed facts of this case), there was no waiver and neither 
party is estopped. Mr. Gaskill's position, addressed on the 
merits, was ruled to be untimely. Mrs. Gaskill's position, as 
limited by the eight year statute of limitations, was found to be 
meritorious. The court's judgment is correct and should be 
affirmed. 
POINT III. DUE TO MR. GASKILL'S FAILURE TO 
BRING TO THE TRIAL COURT'S ATTENTION THE 
INCORRECT AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMENT, AND HIS 
FAILURE TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IN 
SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT, THIS COURT MAY 
SUMMARILY AFFIRM THE AMOUNT OF THE 
JUDGMENT. 
Mr. Gaskill now argues on appeal that the amount of the 
judgment is incorrect. Mr. Gaskill does not explain why this 
matter was not brought to the attention of the trial court by means 
of an objection to the proposed form of order under Rule 4-504(2), 
Code of Judicial Administration, or an appropriate motion under 
Rule 59 or 60, so it could be addressed by the court below. 
Judge Sawaya adopted Commissioner Evans' findings and 
conclusions as his own. R. 114. 
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Mr. Gaskill has failed to make a sufficient record below 
or to marshal the evidence in support of this amount, and the 
judgment may be affirmed by this court on that basis. 
On appeal, it is the burden of the party seeking to 
overturn the trial court's decision to "marshal the 
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate 
that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings 
are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear 
weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly 
erroneous. 'ff 
Haqan v. Haqan, 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App.1991) (quoting In re 
Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)); accord, Crouse v. Crouse, 
817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah App. 1991); Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 
468 (Utah App. 1989); Foxley v. Foxley, 801 P.2d 155 (Utah App. 
1990); Deeben v. Deeben, 772 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1989). 
"If the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the 
appellate court assumes that the record supports the findings of 
the trial court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the 
lower court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in 
the case." Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah App. 1991). 
Because Mr. Gaskill has failed to make any record below, failed to 
bring this matter to the trial court's attention, and failed to 
marshal the evidence in support of the fact finding as to amount, 
this Court may summarily affirm. 
Because counsel for Mrs. Gaskill mistakenly supplied the 
trial court with the incorrect figure included in the judgment, 
counsel feels it is only appropriate that the correct amount be set 
forth here. Although this information, like the information 
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contained in appellant's brief, is not part of the record and thus 
not properly before this Court, it is nevertheless helpful to this 
Court in addressing the equities of this situation and whether 
review is appropriate under a plain error analysis. 
The trial court granted judgment for the eight year 
period preceding Mrs. Gaskill's action for judgment, plus judgment 
for the six month period during which the action was pending. 
Monthly payments of $450.00 are due from January 1, 1984 through 
June 1, 1992 (a total of 102 payments), together with simple 
interest on such amounts from the date they became due through June 
30, 1992, see Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2). The formula for 
calculating this amount is as follows: 
Pi3(l + i21ii) 
where p = monthly payment amount, 
n = number of payments owing, and 
i = monthly interest (.10/12, or .83333%) 
For n = 96, as calculated by Mr. Gaskill, the result is $60,660. 
This would be the amount due and owing as of January 1, 1992. The 
trial court, however, granted judgment for all amounts through June 
30, 1992 (the 96 payments referenced by Mr. Gaskill plus the 6 
additional payments that accrued during the pendency of the 
action). See R. 114. With n = 102, proper calculation yields a 
result of $65,598.75. This is the correct amount of the judgment 
as of June 30, 1992, the date chosen by the trial court. 
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This amount has accrued post-judgment interest from June 
30, 1992 through March 31, 1993 at 12% per annum, see Utah Code 
Ann. § 15-1-4, or 9% for nine months, in the amount of $5,903.89. 
Additionally, Mr. Gaskill also now owes for July 1992 through March 
31, 1993 in the principal amount of $4,050.00, together with 
interest (n = 9) in the amount of $168.75. The total owing as of 
March 31, 1993 on the judgment, post-judgment interest, and post-
judgment accrued alimony and interest is therefore $75,721.39. 
POINT IV. LEA GASKILL IS ENTITLED TO HER 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL. 
This Court has repeatedly stated: 
11
'Ordinarily, when fees in a divorce have been awarded 
below to a party who then prevails on appeal, fees will 
also be awarded to that party on appeal. Iff 
Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 840 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting Bell 
v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah App. 1991)(quoting Burt v. Burt, 
799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah App. 1990)). 
After obtaining judgment, Mrs. Gaskill moved for an order 
awarding her attorney fees. By minute entry dated November 12, 
1992 the court awarded Mrs. Gaskill fees in the sum of $1,280 and 
costs in the amount of $106.76. A true and correct copy of this 
minute entry is contained in Addendum A. The court subsequently 
entered an Order Awarding Attorney's Fees on December 2, 1992. A 
true and correct copy is contained in Addendum B. 
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Mrs. Gaskill should be granted her attorney's fees on 
appeal.9 This matter should be remanded to the District Court for 
determination of the proper amount. 
CONCLUSION 
The court had proper jurisdiction when it entered the 
judgment and decree of divorce in 1976. Mr. Gaskill was properly 
defaulted, and judgment was entered in conformity with the 
complaint, except as modified to reduce alimony for the first 30 
months. 
Mr. Gaskill, after he learned of the alimony provision in 
the divorce decree, failed to prosecute his asserted defenses to 
the original decree to a final judgment. Mr. Gaskill's current 
motion to amend the original decree nunc pro tunc is untimely and 
without good cause. 
Mrs. Gaskill had no obligation to have the dismissal 
without prejudice of both parties' claims in 1978 set aside, or to 
sue on her rights at any given time in the future. Her choice to 
wait 12J years was her choice, not a waiver, and does not estop her 
from collecting alimony arrearages now (except to the extent that 
the statute of limitations limits recovery). 
Because Mrs. Gaskill has an independent basis for asserting 
her right to fees, she declines to brief possible entitlement to 
fees for filing a frivolous appeal under Utah R. App. P. 33. Given 
the similarity of the instant facts to those in Baqshaw v. Baqshaw, 
788 P.2d 1057 (Utah App. 1990), and counsel's failure to state that 
he seeks to overturn that decision, this appeal is teetering 
dangerously close to the edge of frivolity. 
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Mr. Gaskill has failed to make a record below concerning 
the amount of the judgment, and has failed to marshal evidence 
supporting the figure in the judgment. This Court may affirm on 
that basis. 
Finally, Mrs. Gaskill is entitled to her fees on appeal. 
The judgment below should be affirmed, and Mrs. Gaskill 
should be granted her attorney's fees on appeal. 
SUBMITTED this first day of March, 1993. 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
tk-;.r.gr 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN "<^ 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused two copies of BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE to be mailed to Brent D. Young, IVIE & YOUNG, 48 North 
University Avenue, P.O. Box 672, Provo, Utah 84603, this _T_ 
day of March, 1993. 
M*-?CX— 
Helen E. Christian 
Robert K. Heineman 
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ADDENDUM A 
Minute Entry dated 11/12/92 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT1 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GASKILL, ALBERTA FANNEY 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
GASKILL, DON R 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. 
D. ATTY. 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 764923691 DA 
DATE 09/29/92 
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK STH 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES HAVING BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE COURT PURSUANT TO RULE 4-501. 
COMES NOW THE COURT AND STATES AS FOLLOWS: I FIND NO 
RESERVATION OF THE ISSUE OF ATTORNEY FEES, NO ANY AFFIDAVITS. 
CC: HELEN E. CHRISTIAN 
BRENT D. YOUNG 
a-i 
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ADDENDUM B 
Order Awarding Attorney's Fees dated December 2, 1992 
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?::.:; u»7SiC7C3iiBT 
Third Judicial District 
DEC 2 1992 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247)
 0 &AT LAKE COUNTY 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN y<> ^A^^Qp^/ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff (J««ra*k 
Suite 722 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
ALBERTA FANNIE GASKILL a/k/a 
LEE or LEA GASKILL, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DON R. GASKILL, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AWARDING 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Civil No. 764923691 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
ooOoo 
This matter having come before the Court on Plaintiff's 
request for attorney's fees reserved pursuant to an earlier Order 
of the Court, Plaintiff, ALBERTA FANNIE GASKILL, represented by her 
counsel of record, Helen E. Christian, and Defendant, DON R. 
GASKILL, represented by his counsel of record, Brent D. Young, and 
the Court having reviewed thp Affidavits submitted by Plaintiff and 
her counsel, and having reviewed the file and bein^ otherwise fully 
advised in the premises, and having made and entered its Minute 
Entry of November 12, 1992, the Court now hereby makes and enters 
the following Order: 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
Plaintiff is awarded and Defendant is ordered to pay to 
Plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of $1,280.00, and costs in 
the amount of $106.76, a total, sum of $1,386.76. 
DATED this -7, day of -NeveBibGr-7 1992. ^ 
BY THE^  COURT/ 
JAMES SAWAYA 
.District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES, by placing 
same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, on this day 
of November, 1992, addressed to: 
Brent D. Young 
IVIE AND YOUNG 
Attorn^v for Defendant 
48 NorLr University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provor UT 84603 
Kay J. Slahtasky 
gaskili.ord 
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